This paper presents some recent developments in the theory of coalition and network formation. For this purpose, a few major equilibrium concepts recently introduced to model the formation of coalition structures and networks among players are brie ‡y reviewed and discussed. Some economic applications are also illustrated to give the ‡avour of the type of predictions such models are able to provide. 
Introduction
Very often in social life individuals take decisions within groups (households, friendships, …rms, trade unions, local jurisdictions, etc.). Since von Neumann and Morgenstern's (1944) seminal work on game theory, the problem of the formation of coalitions has been a highly debated topic among game theorists. 1 However, during this seminal stage and for a long period afterward, the study of coalition formation was almost entirely conducted within the framework of games in characteristic form (cooperative games) which proved not entirely suited in games with externalities, i.e. virtually all games with genuine interaction among players. Only in recent years, a widespread literature on what is currently known as noncooperative coalition formation or endogenous coalition formation has come into the scene with the explicit purpose to represent the process of formation of coalitions of agents and hence modelling a number of relevant economic and social phenomena. 2 Moreover, following this theoretical and applied literature on coalitions, the recent paper by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) opened the door to a new stream of contributions using networks (graphs) to model the formation of links among individuals. 3 Throughout these brief notes, I survey non exhaustively some relevant contributions of this wide literature, with the main aim to provide an overview of some modelling tools for economic applications. For this purpose, some basic guidelines to the application of coalition formation in economics are presented using as primitives the games in strategic form. 4 As far as economic applications are concerned, most of the examples presented here mainly focus, for convenience, on a restricted number of I.O. topics, as cartel formation, horizontal merger and R&D alliances. 1 Von Neumann & Morgenstern's (1944) stable set and Aumann and Maschler's (1964) bargaining set, among the others, were solution concepts primarily designed to solve simultaneously the formation of a coalition structure and the allocation of the coalitional payo¤ among the members of each coalition (see also Greenberg (1994) and Bloch (1997) ). 2 Extensive surveys of the coalition formation literature are contained in Greenberg (1994) , Bloch (1997 Bloch ( , 2003 , Yi (1997 Yi ( , 2003 and Ray and Vohra (1997) . 3 Myerson (1977) and Aumann And Myerson (1988) were among the …rst papers to use graphs to model cooperation between individuals. Excellent surveys of the network literature are contained in Dutta and Jackson (2003) and in Jackson (2003 Jackson ( , 2005a Jackson ( , 2005b Jackson ( , 2007 . 4 Some of the results presented here are also contained in Currarini and Marini (2006) .
Coalitions 2.1 Cooperatives Games with Externalities
Since von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), a wide number of papers have developed solution concepts speci…c to games with coalitions of players. This literature, known as cooperative games literature, made initially a predominant use of the characteristic function as a way to represent the worth of a coalition of players.
De…nition 1 A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU cooperative game) can be de…ned as a pair (N; v), where N = f1; 2; ::i; ::N g is the set of players and v : 2 N ! R + is a mapping (characteristic function) assigning a value or worth to every feasible coalition S.
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The value v(S) can be interpreted as the maximal aggregate amount of utility members of coalition S can achieve by coordinating their strategies. However, in strategic environments players'payo¤s are de…ned on the strategies of all players and the worth (or value) of a group of players cannot be de…ned independently of the groups (or coalitions) formed by external players (N nS). Hence, to obtain v(S) from a strategic situation we need …rst to de…ne an underlying strategic form game.
De…nition 2 A strategic form game is a triple G = fN; (X i ; u i ) i2N g, in which for each i 2 N , X i is the set of strategies with generic element x i , and u i : X 1 ::: X n ! R + is every player's payo¤ function.
Moreover, henceforth we restrict the action space of each coalition S N to X S Q i2S X i . Let, also, v(S) = P i2S u i (x), for x 2 X N Q i2N X i . 6 Example 1 Two-player prisoner's dilemma. The cooperative allocation (3; 3) can be considered stable only if every player is expected to react with strategy B to a deviation of the other player from the cooperative strategy A.
The above example shows that in order to de…ne the worth of a coalition of players, it is required a speci…c assumption on the behaviour of the remaining players.
-and -characteristic Functions
The concepts of and core, formally studied by Aumann (1967) When the underlying strategic form game G is zero-sum, (1) and (2) coincide. In non-zero sum games they can di¤er and, usually, v (S) < v (S) for all S N .
However, and characteristic functions express an irrational behaviour of coalitions of players, acting as if they expected their rivals to minimize their payo¤. Although appealing because immune from any ad hoc assumption on the reaction of the outside players (indeed, 7 Note that players outside S are treated as one coalition, so the implicit assumption here is that playersin N nS stick together after S departure from the grand coalition N . their minimizing behavior is here not meant to represent the expectation of S but rather as a mathematical way to determine the lower bound of S's aggregate payo¤), still this approach has important drawbacks: deviating coalitions are too heavily penalized, while outside players often end up bearing an extremely high cost in their attempt to hurt deviators. Moreover,the little pro…tability of coalitional objections usually yield very large set of solutions (e.g.,large cores).
Nash Behaviour among Coalitions
Another way to de…ne the characteristic function in games with externalities is to assume that in the event of a deviation from N , a coalition S plays à la Nash with the remaining players. 8 Although appealing, such a modelling strategy requires some speci…c assumptions on the coalition structure formed by remaining players N nS. once a coalition S has deviated from N .
Following the Hart and Kurtz's (1983) coalition formation game, two extreme predictions can be assumed on the behaviour of remaining players. Under the so called -assumption, 9 when a coalition deviates from N , the remaining players split up in singletons; under the -assumption, players in N nS stick together as a unique coalition. 10 Therefore, the obtained characteristic functions can be de…ned as follows:
where x is a strategy pro…le such that, for all S N , x S 2 X S and 8j 2 N nS, x j 2 X j x S = arg max
Moreover,
This way to de…ne the worth of a coalition in as a noncooperative equilibrium payo¤ of a game played between coalitions was …rstly proposed by Ichiishi (1983) . 9 Hurt and Kurz's (1983) -game is indeed a strategic coalition formation game with …xed payo¤ division, in which the strategies consist of the choice of a coalition. Despite the di¤erent nature of the two games, there is an analogy concerning the coalition structure induced by a deviation from the grand coalition. 10 See Chander and Tulkens (1997) and Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) for applications of this approach.
where,
In both cases, for (3) and (4) to be well de…ned, the Nash equilibrium of the strategic form game played among coalitions must be unique. Usually, v (S) < v (S) < v (S) for all S N .
Timing and the Characteristic Function
It is also conceivable to modify the -or -assumption (coalitions playing simultaneously à la Nash in the event of a deviation from the grand coalition) reintroducing the temporal structure typical of the and -assumptions.
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When a deviating coalition S moves …rst under the -assumption, the members of S choose a coordinated strategy as leaders, thus anticipating the reaction of the players in N nS, who simultaneously choose their best response as singletons. The strategy pro…le associated to the deviation of a coalition S is the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game in which S is the leader and players in N nS are, individually, the followers. We can indicate this strategy pro…le as a e x(S) = (e x S ; x j (e x S )) such that (4) x S = arg max
and, for every j 2 N nS
Su¢ cient condition for the existence of a pro…le e x(S) can be provided. Assume that G(N nS; x S ), the restriction of the game G to the set of players N nS given the …xed pro…le x S , possesses a unique Nash Equilibrium for every S N and x S 2 X S , where X S is assumed compact.
Let also each player's payo¤ be continuous in each player's strategy. Thus, by the closedness of the Nash equilibrium correspondence (see, for instance, Fudemberg and Tirole (1991)), members of S maximize a continuous function over a compact set and, by 11 See Currarini & Marini (2003) for details.
Weiestrass Theorem, a maximum exists. As a consequence, for every S N , there exists a
Stackelberg equilibrium e x(S).
We can thus de…ne the characteristic function v (S) as follows:
In a similar way, the -assumption can be modi…ed by assuming that a deviating coalition S plays as follower against all remaining players in N nS acting as singleton leaders. Obviously, the same can be done under the -assumption.
The Core in Games with Externalities
We can test the various conversions of v(S) introduced above by examining the di¤erent predictions obtained using the core of (N; v).
We …rst de…ne an imputation for (N; v) as a vector z 2 R n + such that
De…nition 3
The core of a TU cooperative game (N; v) is the set of all imputations z 2 R n + such that
Given that coalitional payo¤s are obtained from an underlying strategic form game, the core can also be de…ned in terms of strategies, as follows.
De…nition 4
The joint strategy x 2 X N is core-stable if there is no coalition S N such
Example 2 (Merger in a linear Cournot oligopoly). Consider three …rms N = f1; 2; 3g with linear technology competing à la Cournot in a linear demand market. Let the demand parameters a and b and the marginal cost c, be selected in such a way that interior Nash equilibria for all coalition structures exist. The set of all possible coalitions of the N players is N = (f1; 2; 3g ; f1g ; f2g ; f3g ; f1; 2g ; f1; 3g ; f2; 3g ; f g) : By de…nition, v(f g) = 0. Note that if all …rms merge, they obtain the monopoly payo¤ v(f1; 2; 3g = . Under theassumption, we know that when, say …rms 1 and 2, jointly leave the merger, a simultaneous duopoly game is played between the coalition f1; 2g and …rm f3g. Hence, v (f1; 2g) = , which is greater than A 12 , the maximum payo¤ at least one …rm will obtain in the grand coalition. Therefore, under the -assumption, the core is empty. Finally, note that since under the -assumption every single …rm playing 
Coalitional Equilibria in Strategic Form Games

Strong Nash Equilibrium
In the 'core approach'described above, players can sign binding agreements. 12 When this assumption is relaxed, a Nash approach to coalitional deviations becomes more appropriate.
The concept of equilibrium proposed by Aumann (1959) , denoted strong Nash equilibrium, extends the Nash equilibrium to every coalitional deviation. Accordingly, a strong Nash equilibrium is de…ned as a strategy pro…le that no group of players can pro…tably object,
given that remaining players are expected not to change their strategies.
De…nition 5 A strategy pro…le b x 2 X N for G is a strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) if there exists no S N and x S 2 X S such that
Obviously, all SNE of G are both Nash Equilibria and Pareto E¢ cient; in addition they satisfy the Nash stability requirement for each possible coalition. As a result, SNE fails to exist in many economic problems, and in particular, whenever Nash Equilibria fail to be Pareto E¢ cient.
For the three players merger game of Example 2, the set of SNE is empty. This is because the symmetric strategy pro…le x = a c 6b
yielding a Pareto-e¢ cient allocation, is not a Nash Equilibrium.
Coalition-proof Nash Equilibrium
To soften the existence problem of the SNE, a re…nement was proposed by Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston (1987) and named coalition-proof Nash Equilibrium (CPNE). Di¤erently from the SNE, here a restriction is imposed on coalional deviations that have to be self-enforcing, i.e., not further improvable by subcoalitions of players.
De…nition 6 A coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) is de…ned inductively with respect to the number of players n in the game: (i) If n = 1, then x 1 2 X 1 is a CPNE if and only
Assume that the coalition-proof Nash equilibria have been de…ned for games with fewer than n players. (a) For any game G with n players, x 2 X N is a self-enforcing strategy pro…le if, for all S N , x S is a CPNE of the reduced game Gx S :(b) Pro…le x is a CPNE of G if it is a self-enforcing strategy pro…le and there is no other self-enforcing strategy pro…le
for all i 2 N and u i x i ; x N ni > u i (x ) for some i 2 N .
For the three players merger game of Example 2, the symmetric Nash strategy pro…le at which the three …rms play independently x = a c 4b
is a CPNE, since coalitional deviations made by two or three players are not self-enforcing.
Cooperative Games with Coalition Structures
According to the original spirit of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) , "the purpose of game theory is to determine everything can be said about coalitions between players, compensation between partners in every coalition, mergers or …ght between coalitions" (p.240).
To introduce the topic of competition among coalitions, a framework di¤erent from which used by traditional cooperative games is required. The …rst required step is to extend the game (N; v) to a game with a coalition structure = (S 1 ; S 2 ; ::::; S m ); i.e., a partition of players N such that for all S h ; S j 2 , S h \ S j = ? and S k=1;2;::m S k = N . The second step is to de…ne the worth to every coalition belonging to a given coalition structure. Finally, a relevant issue is which coalition structure can be considered stable.
In their seminal contribution, Aumann and Drèze (1974) extend the solution concepts of cooperative game theory to games with exogenous coalition structures. In every 2 (N ), the set of all partitions of the N players, each coalition is allowed to distribute its members only its own worth v(S k ), here assumed equal to the Shapley value de…ned for every given coalition structure 2 .
13 However, the above restriction has been criticized as inadequate for all models in which "the raison d'etre for a coalition S to form is that its members try to receive more than v(S) -the worth of S." (Greenberg, 1994 (Greenberg, , p.1313 . A part from this criticism, the most commonly used stability concept within this framework is the coalition structure core.
De…nition 7 Let (N; v) be a cooperative game. The coalition structure 2 (N ) is stable if its core is nonempty, i.e., if there exists a feasible payo¤ z 2 Z( ) such that, for every
The game (N; v) has a coalition structure core if there exists at least one partition that is stable.
The Partition Function Approach
The presence of externalities among coalitions of players calls for a more encompassing approach than that o¤ered by a cooperative games in characteristic function form. For this purpose, in a seminal paper Thrall and Lucas (1963) introduce the games in partition 13 The Shapley value is de…ned as (N; v) = P S N q(s) i (s), where q(s) = In this way, the authors can de…ne the value of every non-empty coalition S of N as
where this minimum is over all partitions which contain S as a distinct coalition. This approach constitutes a generalization of the cooperative game (N ; v) and the two games coincides when the worth of a coalition is independent of the coalitions formed by the other players. When coaltions.payo¤s are not independent, some assumptions are still required to model the behaviour of coalitions with respect to rival.coalitions. Since Ichiishi (1983) , the modern theory of coalition formation adopts the view that coalitions cooperate inside and compete à la Nash with the other coalitions.
The Valution Approach
Since the games in partition function are hard to handle and often pose technical di¢ culties, many recent contributions have imposed a …xed allocation rule distributing the worth of a coalition to all its members. Such a …xed sharing rule gives rise to a per-member payo¤ (valuation) mapping coalition structures into vectors of individual payo¤s. De…nition 10 A coalition structure is core stable if there not exists a coalition S and a coalition structure 0 such that for S 2 0 and for all i 2 S, v i (S;
14 14 Analogous concepts of , , , , -core stability can be de…ned for games in valuation form.
In the merger game of Example 1, the set of all feasible partitions is = (f(1; 2; 3)g ; (f1; 2g ; f3g); (f1; 3g ; f2g); (f1g ; f2g ; f3g)) and the grand coalition is a core-stable coalition structure under the valuations v i , v i , v i and v i . It is not core-stable under the valuation v i .
Noncooperative Games of Coalition Formation
Most recent approaches have looked at the process of coalition formation as a strategy in a well de…ned game of coalition formation (see Bloch, 1997 
Hurt & Kurz' s Games of Coalition Formation
Hurt and Kurz (1983) were among the …rst to study games of coalition formation with a valuation in order to identify stable coalition structures. 15 As valuation, Hurt & Kurz adopt a general version of Owen value for TU games (Owen, 1977) , i.e. a Shapley value with prior coalition structures, that they call Coalitional Shapley value, assigning to every coalition structure a payo¤ vector ' i ( ) in R N , such that (by the e¢ ciency axiom) P
i2N
' i ( ) = v(N ). Given this valuation, the game of coalition formation is modelled as a game in which each player i 2 N announces a coalition S 3 i to which he would like to belong;
for each pro…le = (S 1 ; S 2 ; :::; S n ) of announcements, a partition ( ) of N is assumed to 15 Another seminal contribution is Shenoy (1979) .
be induced on the system. The rule according to which ( ) originates from is obviously a crucial issue for the prediction of which coalitions will emerge in equilibrium. Hurt and Kurz's game predicts that a coalition emerges if and only if all its members have declared it (from which the name of "unanimity rule"also used to describe this game).
Formally:
where
Their game predicts instead that a coalition emerges if and only if all its members have declare the same coalition S (which may, in general, di¤ers from S). Formally:
Note that the two rules of formation of coalitions are "exclusive" in the sense that each player of a forming coalition has announced a list of its members. Moreover, in the gammagame this list has to be approved unanimously by all coalition members. Once introduced these two games of coalition formation, a stable coalition structure for the game ( ) can be de…ned as a partition induced by a Strong Nash Equilibrium strategy pro…le of these games.
De…nition 11
The partition is a -stable ( -stable) coalition structure if = ( ) for some with the following property: there exists no S N and S 2 S such that
It can be seen that the two rules generate di¤erent partitions after a deviation by a coalition: in the -game, remaining players split up in singletons; in the -game, they stick together.
Example 3 N = f1; 2; 3g, 1 = f1; 2; 3g; 2 = f1; 2; 3g; 3 = f3g ( ) = (f1g ; f2g ; f3g); ( ) = (f1; 2g ; f3g):
In the recent literature on endogenous coalition formation, the coalition formation game The Nash equilibrium of the game G( ) (assumed unique) gives the payo¤ of each coalition in ; within coalitions, a …x distribution rule yields the payo¤s of individual members.
Following our previous assumptions (see section 1.2) we can derived the game G( ) from the the strategic form game G by assuming that
as the per capita payo¤ function of members of S k . Therefore, using Example 1, for the -game , u i (x (f1; 2; 3g) =
and
, for i = 1; 2; 3. Therefore, the grand coalition is the only stable coalition structure of the -game of coalition formation. For the -game, there are no stable coalition structures.
If we extend the merger game to n …rms, we know that the payo¤ of each …rm i 2 S N when all remaining …rms split up in singletons, is given by:
where n jN j, s jSj and 0 = fSg i2S ; fN g i2N nS . The grand coalition, induced by the pro…le = fN g i2N , is a stable coalition structure in the -game of coalition formation, if
The condition above is usually veri…ed for every s n. Therefore, the stability of the grand coalition for the -merger game holds also for a n-…rm oligopoly.
Sequential Games of Coalition Formation
Bloch ( with another player or a coalition of players. Bloch (1996) shows that this game yields the same stationary subgame perfect equilibrium coalition structure as a much simpler "sizeannouncement game", in which the …rst player announces the size of his coalition and the …rst s 1 players accept; then player i s 1 +1 proposes a size s 2 coalition and this is formed and so on, until the last player is reached [see Figure 3 and 4]. This equivalence is basically due to the ex ante symmetry of players. It can also shown that this size-announcement game possesses a generically unique subgame perfect equilibrium coalition structure.
If we extend the merger game of Example 1 to n > 2 …rms, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium coalition structure of Bloch's (1996) sequential game of coalition formation is a coalition structure = (fSg ; fjg j2N nS ), with s = jSj equal to the …rst integer following 2n + 3 p 4n + 5 =2. 16 The explanation is as follows. We know that when a merger of size s is formed in a Cournot market, the equal-split payo¤ of each …rm i 2 S in the merger 16 We know (Salant et al.,1983 ) that 2n + 3 p 4n + 5 =2.' 0:8n.
is u i (x (fSg ; fjg j2N nS )) = A=s (n s + 2) 2 which is greater than the usual Cournot pro…t
When a merger of size s is in place, each independent …rm outside the merger earns a higher pro…t than that of the members of the merger, equal to u j (x (fSg ; fjg j2N nS )) = A= (n s + 2) 2 . Therefore, in the sequential game of coalition formation, the …rst …rms choose to remain independent and free-ride on the merger formed by subsequent …rms. When the number of remaining …rms is exactly equal to the minimal pro…table merger size s = 2n + 3 p 4n + 5 =2, they will choose to merge, as it is no longer pro…table to remain independent.
Equilibrium Binding Agreement
Ray and Vohra (1997) propose a di¤erent stability concept. In this solution concept, players start from some coalition structure and are only allowed to break coalitions to smaller ones.
The deviations can be unilateral or multilateral (i.e., several players can deviate together).
The deviators take into account future deviations, both by members of their own coalitions and by members of other coalitions. Deviations to …ner partitions must be credible, i.e.
stable themselves, and therefore the nature of the de…nition is recursive. We can start with a partition and we can denote by B( ) all coalition structures that are …ner than .
A coalition 0 2 B( ) can be induced from if 0 is formed by breaking a coalition in . A coalition S is a perpetrator if it can induce 0 2 B( ) from . Obviously, S is a subcoalition of a coalition in . Denote the …nest coalition structure, such that jSj = 1 for all S, by 0 . There are no deviations allowed from 0 and therefore 0 is by de…nition stable.
Recursively, suppose that for some , all stable coalitions were de…ned for all 0 2 B( ), i.e., for all coalition structures …ner than . Now, we can say that a strategy pro…le associated to a coalition structure x( ) is sequentially blocked by x( 0 ) for 0 2 B( ) if i) there exists a sequence fx( 1 ); x( 2 ); :::; x( m )g with x( 1 ) = x( ) and x( 0 ) = x( m ); ii) for every j = 2; :::; m, there is a deviator S j that induces j from j 1 ; iii) x( 0 ) is stable; iv) j is not stable for any x( j ) and 1 < j < m; v) u i (x( 0 )) > u i (x( j 1 )) for all i 2 S j and j = 2; :::; m.
De…nition 12 x( ) is an equilibrium binding agreement if there is no x( 0 ) for 0 2 B( ) that sequentially blocks x( ) .
Applying the Equilibrium Binding Agreement to Example 1, we obtain that, apart from x( 0 ), with 0 = (f1g : f2g ; f3g) which is by de…nition stable, also the grand coalition strategy pro…le x( ) with = (f1:2; 3g is an equilibrium binding agreement. For the n-…rm merger game, Ray and Vohra's show that there is a cyclical pattern, in which, depending on n, the grand coalition can or not be a stable coalition structure. For n = 3; 4; 5 it is stable, but not for n = 6; 7; 8. For n = 9 is again stable and so on, with a rather unpredictable 
Some Guidelines to Coalition Formation in Economic Applications
In order to compare and interpret the main predictions that endogenous coalition formation theories obtain in some classical economic problems, it can be useful to use a very simple setup in which the equal sharing rule within each coalition is not assumed but it is obtained through some symmetry assumptions imposed on the strategic form game describing the economic problem at hand. Once some basic assumptions are imposed on the strategic form games underlying the games of coalition formation, the main economic applications can be divided in a few categories: 1) games with positive or negative players-externalities; 2)
games with actions that are strategic complements or substitutes; 3) games with or without coalition-synergies. According to these three features, we usually have a much clearer picture of the predictions which can be expected from the di¤erent concepts of coalitional stability illustrated above and, in particular, of the stability of the grand coalition.
We start imposing some symmetry requirements on the strategic form game G. Lemma 1 For all S N; e x S 2 arg max x S 2X S P i2S u i (x S ; x N nS ) implies e x i = e x j for all i,j 2 S and for all x N nS 2 X N nS :
Proof 1 See Appendix.
An important implication of Lemma 1 is that all players belonging to a given coalition S N will play the same maximizing strategy and then will obtain the same payo¤. We can thus obtain a game in valuation form from a game in partition function form without imposing a …xed allocation rule.
The next lemma expresses the fact that in every coalition structure , at the Nash equilibrium played by coalitions, when players-externalities are positive (negative), being a member of bigger rather than a smaller coalition is convenient only when each member of S plays a strategy that is lower (higher) than that played by each member of a smaller coalition.
Lemma 2 Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then for every S and T 2 , with jT j jSj:
ii) Under Negative Externalities, u s (x( )) u t (x( )) if and only if x s x t .
Proof 2 See Appendix.
Finally, we can use a well known classi…cation of all economic models in two classes: 1)
games in which players'actions are strategic complements; 2) games in which players'actions are strategic substitutes.
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De…nition 13 The payo¤ function u i exhibits increasing di¤erences on X N if for all S,
17 See, for this de…nition, Bulow et al (1985) .
This feature is typical of games, as price oligopoly models with di¤erentiated goods, for which players'best-replies are upward-sloping. For these games, we can prove the following.
Lemma 3 Let assumptions 1-2 hold, and let u i have increasing di¤erences on X N , for all i 2 N . Then for every S and T 2 , with jT j jSj:
i) Positive Externalities imply x s x t ; ii) Negative Externalities imply x s x t .
Proof 3 See Appendix.
Suppose now to have a game with actions that are strategic substitutes. This is the case of Cournot oligopoly and many other economic models. Suppose also that a boundary on the slope of the reaction mapping f S : R N nS ! R S is imposed by the following contraction assumption.
Assumption 3. (contraction) Let S 2 . Then, there exists a c < 1 such that for all
where k:k denotes the euclidean norm de…ned on the space R n s .
Lemma 4
Let assumptions 1-3 hold. Then for every S and T 2 , with jT j jSj: i)
Positive Externalities imply x s x t ; ii) Negative Externalities imply x s x t .
Proof 4 See Currarini and Marini (2006).
Using all lemmata presented above we are now able to compare the valuation of players belonging to di¤erent coalitions in a given coalition structure and then, to a certain extent, the pro…tability of deviations. However, the above analysis is limited to games in which forming a coalition does not enlarge the set of strategy available to its members and does not modify the way payo¤s within a coalition originate from the strategies chosen by players in N. In fact, as assumed at the beginning of the paper, the action space of each coalition
The only advantage for players to form coalitions is to coordinate their strategies in order to obtain a coalitional e¢ cient outcome. This approach encompasses many well known games without synergies, such as Cournot and Bertrand merger or cartel formation and public good and environmental games, but rules out an important driving force of coalition formation, i.e. the exploitation of synergies, typically arising for instance in R&D alliances or mergers among …rms yielding some sort of economies of scales.
Within this framework, we can present the following result.
Proposition 1 Let assumptions 1-2 hold, and let u i possess increasing di¤erences on X N , for all i 2 N . Then the grand coalition N is a stable coalition structure in the game of coalition formation derived from the game in strategic form G.
Proof. By Lemma 3, positive externalities imply that for all , at x( ) larger coalitions choose larger strategies than smaller coalitions, while the opposite holds under negative externalities, and then v i (S; ) v i (T; ) for all S; T 2 with jT j jSj. This directly implies the stability of the grand coalition in . To provide a sketch of this proof, we note that any coalitional deviation from the strategy pro…le yielding the grand coalition induces a coalition structure in which all members outside the deviating coalitions appear as singleton.
Since these players are weakly better o¤ than any of the deviating members, and since all players were receiving the same payo¤ at , a strict improvement of the deviating coalition would contradict the e¢ ciency of the outcome induced by the grand coalition.
In games with increasing di¤erences, players strategies are strategic complements, and best replies are therefore positively sloped. The stability of the e¢ cient coalition structure = fN g in this class of games can be intuitively explained as follows. In games with positive externalities, a deviation of a coalition S N will typically be associated with a lower level of S's members'strategies with respect to the e¢ cient pro…le x ( ), and with a higher level in games with negative externalities (see lemma 3 and 4 above). If strategies are the quantity of produced public good or prices (positive player-externalities), S will try to free ride on non members by reducing its production or its price; if strategies are emissions of pollutant or quantities (negative player-externalities), S will try to emit or produce more and take advantage of non members'lower emissions or quantities. The extent to which these deviations will be pro…table ultimately depend on the reaction of non members. In the case of positive externalities, S will bene…t from an increase of non members'production levels or prices; however, strategic complementarity implies that the decrease of S's production levels or prices will be followed by a decrease of the produced levels or prices of non members.
Similarly, the increase of S's pollutant emissions or quantities will induce higher pollution or quantity levels by non members. Free riding is therefore little pro…table in these games.
From the above discussion, it is clear that deviations can be pro. . . table only if best reply functions are negatively sloped, that is, strategies must be substitutes in G. However, the above discussion suggests that some "degree"of substitutability may still be compatible with stability. Indeed, if S's decrease in the production of public good is followed by a moderate increase in the produced level of non members, S may still not …nd it pro…table to deviate from the ec / cient pro…le induced by . Therefore, if the absolute value of the slope of the reaction maps is bounded above by 1, the stability result of proposition 1 extends to games with strategic substitutes.
Proposition 2 Let assumptions 1-3 hold. The grand coalition N is a stable coalition structure in the game of coalition formation derived from the game in strategic form G.
Moreover, we can extend the results of proposition 1 and 2 to games with negative coalition-externalities. 18 See Bloch (1997) or Yi (2003) for such a de…nition. There is not a clear relationship between games with positive (or negative) player-externalities and games with positive (or negative) coalition-externalities. However, for most well known games without synergies, both positive-player externalities (PPE) plus strategic complement actions (SC) as well as negative-player externalities (NPE) plus strategic substitute actions (SS) yield games with positive coalition-externalities. These are the cases of merger or cartel games in quantity oligopolies (NPE+SS), merger or cartel games in price oligopolies (PPE+SC) and public goods (PPE+SS) or environmental games (NPE+SS). Similarly, we can obtain Negative Coalition-Externalities in a game by associating NPE and SC as in a cartel game in which goods are complements and then the game exhibits SC.
Proposition 4 Let assumptions 1-3 hold. Let also the game (N; ; v i ) exhibits negative coalition-externalities. Then the grand coalition N is a stable coalition structure in the game of coalition formation derived from the game in strategic form G.
A comparison of the above results, obtained for Hurt and Kurz's (1985) games of coalition formation, with the other solution concepts can be mentioned. It can be shown (see Yi, 1997) that for all games without synergies in which -as in the merger example -players prefer to stay as singletons to free-ride on a forming coalition -Bloch's (1996) sequential game of coalition formation gives rise to equilibrium coalition structures formed by one coalition and a fringe of coalition acting as singletons. Moreover, even in a linear oligopoly merger game, Ray and Vohra's (1997) Equilibrium Binding Agreement may or may not support the grand coalition as a stable coalition structure, depending on the number of …rms in the market.
When the game G is a game with synergies, a classi…cation of the possible results. becomes even more complex. To give an illustration, we can introduce a simple form of synergy by assuming, as in Bloch's (1995) and Yi's (1997) R&D alliance models, that when …rms coordinate their action and create a R&D alliance, they pool their research assets in such a way to reduce the cost of each …rm in proportion to the number of …rms cooperating in the project. 19 Let the producing cost of …rms participating to a R&D alliance of s …rms be c(x i ; s i ) = (c + 1 s i )x i , where s i is the cardinality of the alliance containing …rm i: Let also a > c n. As shown by Yi (1997) , at the unique Nash equilibrium associated with every coalition structure , the pro…t of each …rrm in a coalition of size s i is given by:
When = ( 0 ), symmetry can be used to reduce the above expression to:
Straightforward manipulations show that the deviation of a coalition S i from the grand coalition in the game is always pro…table whenever:
For example, for n = 8, a deviation by a group of six …rms (s i = 6) induces a per …rm
higher than the every …rm's payo¤ in the grand coalition
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. Therefore, it becomes more di¢ cult to predict the stable coalition structures in Hurt and Kurz's and -games. In the sequential games of coalition formation (Bloch, 1996 and Ray & Vohra 1999) for a linear Cournot oligopoly in which …rms can form reducing-cost alliances, and each …rm's i 2 S bears a marginal cost
where s is the size of the alliance to which …rm's i belongs, the equilibrium pro…t of each …rm i 2 S is:
Therefore, the formation of alliances induces negative externalities on outsiders, just because an alliance reduces marginal costs of participants and make them more aggressive in the market. Moreover, members of larger alliance have higher pro…ts and then, if membership is open, all …rms wants to belong to the association (Bloch, 1996 (Bloch, , 2005 . In the game of sequential coalition formation, anticipating that remaining players will form an association of size (n s), the …rst s players optimally decide to admit s = (3n + 1) =4 and the unique equilibrium coalition structure results in the formation of two associations of unequal size
; n 1 4 : 3 Networks
Notation
We follow here the standard notation applied to networks. 20 A nondirected network (N; g) describes a system of reciprocal relationships between individuals in a set N = f1; 2; ::; ng, as friendships, information ‡ows and many others. Individuals are nodes in the graph g and links represent bilateral relationship between individuals. 21 It is common to refer directly to 
Value Functions and Allocation Rules
It is possible to de…ne a value function assigning to each network a worth.
De…nition 15 A value function for a network is a function v : G ! R.
Let V be the set of all possible value functions. In some applications v(g)
G. If the value is transferable across players, this coincides with Pareto-e¢ ciency. 22 Since the network is …nite, it always exists an e¢ cient network. Another relevant modelling feature is the way in which the value of a network is distributed among the individuals forming the network.
De…nition 16 An allocation rule is a function
Thus, Y i (g; v) is the payo¤ obtained by every player i 2 N (g) under the value function v.
Some important properties of the value functions v and of the allocation rules Y are listed below. (
This property requires that the value of the network equals the sum of the value of its components. This means that the value of one component is independent of the structure of the other components. When an allocation rule Y distributes all the value accruing to one component to its members, it is component balanced.
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(2) Component Balance. An allocation rule is component balanced if for any component additive v, for every g 2 G and g 0 2 C(g) 
This property implies that under Y every i and j gain equally from the existence of their link when compared to their payo¤s in absence of this link. If we take a permutation of the players p : N ! N , we can de…ne the same network with permuted individuals as
we say that the value function is anonymous.
(4) Anonymity. An allocation rule Y is anonymous if for any permutation p of the
A strong symmetry assumption on the allocation rule Y requires that for all anonymous
When compared to the characteristic function of cooperative games (see Section 1.1),
here a value function v is sensitive not only to the number of players connected (in a component of g) but also to the speci…c architecture in which they are connected. However, v can be restricted to depend only on the number of players connected in a coalition. In a seminal contribution, Myerson (1977) starts with a TU cooperative game (N; v) and overlaps a com- 24 An allocation rule is balanced if
munication network g to such a framework. Myerson (1977) associates a "graph-restricted value" v g : 2 N ! R, assigning to each coalition S a value equal to the sum of worth generated by the connected components of players in S. Formally, players in S have links in g(S) = f ij 2 gj i 2 S; j 2 Sg and this induces a partition of S into subsets of players 
3.3 Networks Formation Games 
Networks Formation in Strategic Form
Myerson (1991) suggests a noncooperative game of network formation in strategic form. 
We can also de…ne a network g Nash stable with respect to a value function v and an allocation rule Y , if there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium such that g = g( ).
The concept of Nash equilibrium applied to the network formation game appears a too weak notion of equilibrium, due to the bilateral nature of links. The empty network (a g with no links) is always Nash stable for any v and Y . Moreover, all networks in which there is a gain in forming additional links but no convenience to sever existing links are also Nash stable. Re…nements of the Nash equilibrium concept for the network formation process have been proposed. The pairwise stability introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) plays a prominent role in the recent developments of the analysis of networks formation.
Pairwise Stability
We should expect that in a stable network players do not bene…t by altering the structure of the network. Accordingly, Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) de…nes a notion of network stability denoted pairwise stability.
De…nition 16.
A network g is pairwise stable with respect to the allocation rule Y and
, and
As shown by Jackson and Watts (1998), a network is pairwise stable if and only if it has no improving path emanating from it. An improving path is a sequence of networks fg 1 ; g; :::; g K g, where each network g k is defeated by a subsequent (adjacent) network g k+1 ,
, with at least one inequality holding strictly. Thus, if there not exists any pairwise stable network, then it must exists at least one cycle, i.e. an improving path fg 1 ; g; :::; g K g with g 1 = g K . Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) show that the existence of pairwise stable networks is always ensured for certain allocation rules. They prove that under the egalitarian and the component-wise egalitarian rules, 29 pairwise stable networks always exists. In particular, under the egalitarian rule, any e¢ cient network is pairwise stable.
Under the component-wise allocation rule, a pairwise stable network can always be found.
This can be done for component additive v by …nding components C that maximize the payo¤s of its players, and then continuing this process for the remaining players N nN (C).
The network formed by all these components is pairwise stable. Another allocation rule 29 The egalitarian allocation rule Y e is such that Y i e (g; v) = c and therefore , the empty network is the only e¢ cient pairwise stable network.
Thus, the example above shows that a pairwise stable network can either be ine¢ cient or e¢ cient, depending on the cost range. The tension between e¢ ciency and stability appears here for intermediate levels of the cost.
Further Re…nements of Network Stability Concepts
As in the case of coalition formation, equilibrium concepts immune to coordinated deviations by players are also conceivable for networks (see Dutta and Mutuswami, 1997, Dutta, Tijs and van den Noweland, 1998 and Jackson and van den Noweland 2005). By allowing every subset of players to coordinate their strategies in arbitrary ways yields a strong Nash equilibrium for network formation games. That is, a strategy pro…le 2 N is a strong Nash equilibrium of the network formation game if there not exist a coalition S N and a strategy pro…le 0 S 2 S such that
with strict inequality for at least one i 2 S. Hence, a network g is strongly stable with respect to a value function v and an allocation rule Y , if there exists a strong Nash equilibrium such that g = g( ).
Similarly, an intermediate concept of stability, stronger than pairwise stability and weaker than strong Nash equilibrium, has been proposed (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) and denoted 31 For N > 3 the encompassing star is not necessarily the unique pairwise network.
pairwise Nash equilibrium. This can be de…ned as a strategy pro…le 2 N such that, for all player i and all strategies
and there not exists a pair of agents (i; j) such that
with strict inequality for at least one of the agents. Therefore, a network g is pairwise Nash stable with respect to a value function v and an allocation rule Y , if there exists a pairwise Nash equilibrium such that g = g( ).
32
It can be shown that, given a value function v and an allocation rule Y , the set of strongly stable networks is weakly included in the set of pairwise Nash stable networks and that the latter set coincides with the intersection of pairwise stable networks and Nash stable networks. 33 Moreover, the set of pairwise stable networks and the set of Nash stable networks can be completely disjoint even though neither is empty. markets. By signing bilateral agreement they commit not to enter each other's market. 32 This equilibrium concept has been adopted in applications by Goyal and Joshi (2003) Bloch and Jackson (2007) , for an extensions of these equilibrium concepts to the case in which transfers among players are allowed.
If ij 2 g, …rm i withdraws from market j and …rm j withdraws from market i. For every network g and given N …rms, let n i (g) denote the number of …rms in …rm i's market, with 
With linear demand and zero marginal cost, under Cournot competition we obtain
If n 3; there are exactly two pairwise stable networks, the empty network and the complete network. For n = 2, the complete network is the only stable network.
Note that the empty network is stable since for every symmetric …rm the bene…t to form a link is
that, for n 3, is negative.
For every incomplete network, U i (g) U i (g ij) 0, requires that and this holds only for n i (g) = n j (g) = 1, i.e., when the network is complete.
In this case (see, Figure 6 for the case with 3 …rms), Therefore, it follows that the only nonempty network which is pairwise stable is the complete network.
Bilateral Collaboration among Firms
Bloch (2002) and Goyal and Joshi (2003) consider the formation of bilateral alliances between …rms that reduce their marginal cost, as
where d i (g) denotes the degree of vertex i, i.e. the number of bilateral agreements signed by …rm i.
Under Cournot competition with linear demand, we have each …rm's pro…t is given by U i (g) = a n + 1
For such a case, the only pairwise stable network turns out to be the complete network g N (see Goyal and Joshi, 2003) . This is because, by signing an agreement, each …rm increases its quantity by q i = n n + 1 , consequently, its pro…t. Moreover, when a large …xed cost to form a link is included in the model, Goyal and Joshi show that stable networks possess a speci…c form, with one complete component and a few singleton …rms.
Appendix
Lemma 1. For all S N; e x S 2 arg max x S 2X S P i2S u i (x S ; x N nS ) implies e x i = e x j for all i,j 2 S and for all x N nS 2 X N nS : Proof 1. Suppose e x i 6 = e x j for some i; j 2 S: By symmetry we can derive from e x S a new vector x 0 S by permuting the strategies of players i and j such that and hence, by the strict quasiconcavity of all u i (x); for all 2 (0; 1) we have that: Since, by the convexity of X; the strategy vector x 0 S + (1 )e x S 2 X S ; we obtain a contradiction.
Lemma 2. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then for every S and T 2 , with jT j jSj: i) Under Positive Externalities, u s (x( )) u t (x( )) if and only if x s x t ; ii) Under Negative Externalities, u s (x( )) u t (x( )) if and only if x s x t .
Proof 2. We …rst prove the result for the case of positive externalities, starting with the "only if" part. By assumption 1, all members of T get the same payo¤ at x ( ). By de…nition of x( ), the pro…le in which all members of T play x t maximizes the utility of each member of T , so that (8) u t ((x t ; x t ) x s ) u t ((x s ; x s ) ; x s ):
Suppose now that x s > x t . By assumption 1 and 2.1 we have (9) u t ((x s ; x s ) ; x s ) = u t i ((x s ; x s ) ; x s ) = u s ((x s ; x s ) ; x s ) > u s ((x t ; x t ) ; x s ):
To prove the "if" part, consider coalitions T 1 , T 2 and S which, as de…ned at the beginning of this section, are such that jT 1 j = jSj and such that fT 1 ; T 2 g forms a partition of T . By de…nition of x( ), the utility of each member of S is maximized by the strategy pro…le x S .
Using the de…nition of u s and of x s we write:
(10) u s ((x t ; x t ) ; x s ) u s ((x t ; x t ) ; x t ):
By assumption 2.1, if x s x t then (11) u s ((x t ; x t ) ; x t ) u s ((x s ; x t ) ; x t ):
Finally, by assumption 1 and the fact that jT 1 j = jSj, we obtain (12) u s ((x s ; x t ) ; x t ) = u t 1 ((x t ; x t ) ; x s ) = u t ((x t ; x t ) ; x s );
implying, together with (11) and (12) , that (13) u s (x( )) = u s ((x t ; x t ) ; x s ) u t ((x t ; x t ) ; x s ) = u t (x( )):
Consider now the case of negative externalities (assumption 2.2). Condition (8) holds independently of the sign of the externality. Suppose therefore that x s < x t . By negative externalities and symmetry we have (14) u t ((x s ; x s ); x s ) = u s ((x s ; x s ); x s ) > u s ((x t ; x t ) ; x s ):
The "if" part is proved considering again coalitions T 1 , T 2 and S. Again, Condition (10) holds independently of the sign of the externality. By negative externalities, if x s x t then (15) u s ((x t ; x t ) ; x t ) u s ((x s ; x t ) ; x t ):
As before, we use assumption 1 and the fact that jT 1 j = jSj to obtain (16) u s ((x s ; x t ) ; x t ) = u t ((x t ; x t ) ; x s );
and, therefore, that (17) u s (x( )) = u s (x t ; x s ) u t (x t ; x s ) = u t (x( )):
Lemma 3. Let assumptions 1-2 hold, and let u i have increasing di¤erences on X N , for all i 2 N . Then for every S and T 2 , with jT j jSj: i) Positive Externalities imply
x s x t ; ii) Negative Externalities imply x s x t .
Proof 3. i) Suppose that, contrary to our statement, positive externalities hold and x s > x t . By increasing di¤erences of u i for all i 2 N (and using the fact that the sum of functions with increasing di¤erence has itself increasing di¤erences), we obtain:
(18) u s ((x s ; x t ); x s ) u s ((x s ; x t ); x t ) u s ((x t ; x t ); x s ) u s ((x t ; x t ); x t ):
By de…nition of x s we also have:
(19) u s ((x t ; x t ); x s ) u s ((x t ; x t ); x t ) 0:
Conditions (18) and (19) directly imply:
(20) u s ((x s ; x t ); x s ) u s ((x s ; x t ); x t ) 0:
Referring again to the partition of T into the disjoint coalitions T 1 and T 2 , an application of the symmetry assumption 1 yields:
u s ((x s ; x t ); x s ) = u t 1 ((x s ; x t ); x s ); (21) u s ((x s ; x t ); x t ) = u t 1 ((x t ; x t ); x s ):
Conditions (20) and (21) imply: (22) u t 1 ((x s ; x t ); x s ) u t 1 ((x t ; x t ); x s ):
Positive externalities and the assumption that x s > x t imply:
(23) u t 2 ((x s ; x t ); x s ) > u t 2 ((x t ; x t ); x s ):
Summing up conditions (22) and (23), and using the de…nition of T 1 and T 2 , we obtain:
(24) u t ((x s ; x t ); x s ) > u t ((x t ; x t ); x s );
which contradicts the assumption that x t maximizes the utility of T given x s .
The case ii) of negative externalities is proved along similar lines. Suppose that x s < x t .
Conditions (20) and (21), which are independent of the sign of the externalities, hold, so that (22) follows. Negative externalities also imply that if x s < x t then (23) follows. We therefore again obtain condition (24) and a contradiction.
